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I.) Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A.) Issues *
The International Criminal Court (hereinafter the “ICC”), which was established
by the Rome Statute that entered into force on 1 July 2002, has jurisdiction ratione
temporis 1 over specific international crimes 2 committed either by individuals within the
territory of a state that has ratified the Rome Statute, or by individuals who are citizens of
a State party to the Rome Statute. 3 Certain preconditions must be met; however, before a
case can be investigated and prosecuted before the ICC. The primary focus of this
memorandum will be to evaluate whether a referral by the United Nations Security
Council (hereinafter the “SC”) can be challenged by a state pursuant to the principle of
complementarity. In addition, this note will explore the particular situation 4 in the Darfur

ISSUE: Does the principle of complementarity apply to Security Council referrals to the
ICC? The Sudan claims that it does and seeks to block the ICC from investigating and
prosecuting cases related to Darfur by instituting its own investigation and prosecution.

*

See, The Rome Statute Art. 11. The ICC will only have jurisdiction over crimes
committed after 1 July 2001 and the Rome Statute does not apply retroactively.
{Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 2}
1

Id. at Art. 5 which states that the ICC shall have jurisdiction over the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression (Note: a formal definition of
aggression has yet to be set by the ICC and the next opportunity to do so will not come
until 2009). See also, Art. 6-8 for detailed elements of the crimes listed supra.
2

3

Id. at Art. 4.

Note, the term “situation” is used by the Rome Statute to describe an instance when one
of the four core crimes of Art. 5 is committed. During the Diplomatic Conferences
preceding the adoption of the Rome Statute, the term, situation, was felt to be less
restrictive than “war” or “armed conflict.” Furthermore, the use of “situation” does not
implicate one individual in particular and it is up to the Prosecutor to investigate the
proceedings and determine if there is a “case.” See Art. 15 of the Rome Statute.
4

1

and whether the Sudan, which is not party to the Rome Statute, 5 can employ the principle
of complementarity and effectively supersede the SC’s referral to the ICC. 6
B.) Summary of Conclusions
1.) The Security Council Has the Broad Responsibility to Maintain
International Peace and Security.
Among all international organizations, the SC has the unique responsibility and
obligation to maintain international peace and security.7 The powers conferred upon it
by Chapter VII 8 of the UN Charter specifically allow the SC to determine how to uphold
its mandate pursuant to the UN Charter. All UN Member States are bound to cooperate
with, and abide by, the SC’s decisions even if a treaty obligation would support contrary
action. 9
2.) The Principle of Complementarity Should Not Apply to a Security
Council Referral to the ICC Pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.

The Sudan is a signatory to the Rome Statute but has yet to ratify it at the time this
memorandum was authored.

5

See, U.N.S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593
(2005). {Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 20}.
6

See, UN Charter Preamble. See also, UN Charter Chapter VII. {Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}

7

8

Id.

See, e.g., Art. 2(2) of the UN Charter which holds that all UN Member States “shall
fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this UN
Charter.” See also, Art. 103 of the UN Charter affirming, “In the event of a conflict
between the obligations of Members of the UN and their obligations under any other
international agreement, [the] obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.
9

2

Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, 10 the SC is empowered to employ various
non-military methods to maintain international peace and security. The SC exercised this
power when it established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(hereinafter the “ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter
the “ICTR”). Like the SC determination that situations in the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda necessitated the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals, its referrals to the ICC
should be deemed a legislative finding of fact. The SC itself determines that a State is
unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute or investigate the offenses that are the
subjects of the referral; but, it does not act as the judiciary (as this is the prerogative of
the ICC). Because the SC’s mandate is supported by the primacy of Chapter VII, the
principle of complementarity, found in Article 17 of the Rome Statute, 11 cannot exist
contemporaneously with a SC referral.
3.) The Principle of Complementarity Should Not Apply to the
Situation in the Darfur.
If the principle of complementarity applied and Sudanese domestic courts were
able to handle any investigation or prosecution of individuals, genuine and adequate
investigation and prosecution of individuals would be completely lacking. Pursuant to
SC Resolution 1593, the SC established an International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur (hereinafter the “ICID”) to investigate and to make recommendations on how to

See, Art. 41 of the UN Charter. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
3}.
10

See generally, Art. 17 of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 2}.
11

3

end the perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 12 The ICID found that
Sudanese government was unwilling and unable to prosecute individuals 13 suspected of
commissioning one of the core crimes outlined in Article 5 of the Rome Statute and that
the legal system was in such disarray that the legal proceedings could not be genuinely
handled in the Sudan. 14 The ICID suggested an immediate referral of the situation to the
ICC as the most effective and efficient method to halt atrocities. 15
4.) Policy Reasons Counsel Against Applying the Principle of
Complementarity Contemporaneously With A SC Referral.
The referral of the situation in the Darfur 16 is the first time that the SC has
employed Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute. 17 If the Sudan were allowed to counter the
referral and demand application of the principle of complementarity, the purpose of a SC
referral pursuant to Chapter VII would be defeated. The SC’s determination that a
serious threat to international peace and security existed in the Darfur, logically implies

See, Report of the International Commission on the Inquiry on Darfur to the United
Nations Secretary-General: Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18
September 2004 (25 January 2005). {Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 8}.

12

See, Article 17 of the Rome Statute which employs the unwilling or unable language to
determine if a case could in fact be admissible to the ICC. {Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 2}.
13

14

See, ICID Report, supra footnote 12, at ¶ 572.

15

Id.

See, U.N.S.C. Res. 1593, supra footnote 6. {Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 20}.
16

The ICC has received three self-referrals (pursuant to Art. 14 of the Rome Statute) of
situations from Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African
Republic. See generally, Carsten Stahn et al, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 421, 422. The referral by
the SC of the situation in the Darfur is the first time that an Art. 13 referral has been made
to the Court. {Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 56}.
17

4

that the Sudan is not genuinely willing or able to investigate or prosecute individuals.
The application of the principle of complementarity would stymie the effectiveness of a
SC referral – thus forcing the SC to establish a new ad hoc tribunal in order to satisfy its
mandate under the UN Charter. The ICC is to replace ad hoc tribunals, and in order for it
to remain a legitimate, international judicial body, it needs to demonstrate that it is
capable of effectively handling situations referred to it.

II.) Factual Background
Acting pursuant to its UN Charter Chapter VII mandate, the SC determined that
the escalating violence and continuous perpetration of heinous crimes in the Darfur
region of the Sudan necessitated a referral to the ICC. 18 Prior to the referral, the SC
enacted other measures to restore international peace and security in the Darfur; but, it
was felt that the most effective and expedient means to end violence and impunity 19 in
the region was to employ the ICC.
The Sudan, which is not party to the Rome Statute, has argued that it should be
allowed to employ the principle of complementarity 20 and that the ICC has no
See, U.N.S.C. Res. 1593, supra footnote 6. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 20}.
18

Impunity is generally defined as “an exemption or protection from punishment.”
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)(West 2005). { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 58}.
19

Sudanese President Umar al-Bashir stated that “his government would not hand over
any of its citizens for trial outside [of the Sudan and] . . . Sudan’s own judiciary was
qualified and ready to try those accused of any violations in Darfur.” See, “Sudan:
Judiciary Challenges ICC Over Darfur Cases,” 24 June 2005, United Nations Integrated
Regional Information Networks, at www.irinnews.org. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 62}.
20

5

jurisdiction over individuals who have perpetrated crimes in the Darfur. While some
prosecution and investigation of criminals has occurred in the Sudan, only “small-time
criminals,” and not senior government officials, have been tried thus far. 21 The SC, and
the UN as a whole, employed the ICID as a legislative finder of fact and it determined
that the current Sudanese government, coupled with the ongoing instability and
continuous perpetration of heinous crimes, created an environment where the Sudan is
unwilling and unable to genuinely investigate and prosecute individuals. 22 The situation
was referred to the ICC because the SC felt that it was the most appropriate venue to
provide neutral adjudication of situations and the SC did not want to overstep its mandate
by acting as a judicial body.

III.) Legal Discussion
A.) The Role of the Security Council
1.) The Powers of the Security Council in General
The significant powers of the SC must be considered when determining whether
the principle of complementarity should apply to its referrals to the ICC. The SC is
entrusted by all UN Member States as the primary body responsible for the maintenance
of international peace and security, 23 and all UN Members (including the Sudan) are
bound by, and expected to carryout, the mandates of the SC. 24

21

The general powers

Id.

See generally, ICID Report, supra footnote 12. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 8}.

22

23

See, UN Charter Art. 24. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.

24

See, UN Charter Art. 25. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.
6

given to the SC by the UN Charter, particularly under Chapter VII, suggest that a positive
referral 25 of a situation to the ICC cannot be contested by any UN Member, regardless of
whether or not they have accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction. Obligations to the UN and its
mandates supersede all other international agreements and have primacy. 26
The SC is in the best position to determine what measures should be taken to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 27 Specifically, in Article 41, the SC
is authorized to employ non-military measures to give effect to its decisions. 28 While
Article 41 does provide certain examples of when the SC is authorized to take nonmilitary actions, 29 the list was not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to provide

See, Sir Franklin Berman, “The Relationship Between the ICC and the SC,” In
RELFECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ADRIAAN BOS, (EDS.) HERMAN A.M. VON HEBEL ET AL (2000).
Sir Berman (head of the United Kingdom’s delegation to the Rome Conference) calls SC
referrals pursuant to Art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute, “positive referrals.” I find that this is
a useful term to distinguish the positive referrals (conferring jurisdiction on the ICC)
from the negative referrals pursuant to Art. 16 of the Rome Statute under which the SC
can prevent the ICC from having automatic jurisdiction. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 40}.
25

See, UN Charter Art. 103. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.
See also, Michael A. Newton 167 Mil. L. R. 20, 50, citing UN Charter Art. 103. “All
members of the [UN] are obligated to comply with orders of the [SC] even if the Rome
Statute or any other international agreement would impose conflicting obligations.”
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 52}.
26

27

See, UN Charter Art. 39. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.

28

UN Charter Art. 41. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.

Article 41 specifically includes interruptions in economic relations and rail, sea, air,
postal, telegraphic, radio and other communications, and the severance of diplomatic
relations as situations under which the SC can deploy non-martial measures to give
effects to its decisions.
29

7

examples. 30 The SC’s effectiveness depends upon its ability to preserve international
peace and security through a variety of channels.
Notably, the SC is empowered by the UN Charter to any establish subsidiary
organs it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. 31 These subsidiary
organs can comprise judicial bodies as evidenced by the UN’s approval of the SC’s
establishment of the ad hoc tribunals to try war crimes perpetrated in both the Former
Yugoslavia 32 (hereinafter the “FY”) and Rwanda. 33

B.) The Security Council’s Establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR
It is important to recognize that the ad hoc tribunals established by the SC for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda provide the only real structural and procedural
precedence for the ICC. Both courts confirmed the power of the SC to create
“appropriate international agencies . . . to restore international peace and security,” 34 and

See e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic (Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction), ¶ 35, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995). The ICTY determined
that Art. 41 was not meant to be narrowly construed and that the measures set out were,
“merely illustrative examples which do not exclude other measures. { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 27}.
30

31

UN Charter Art 29. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.

See, U.N.S.C. Res 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. 3217th mtg., at U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993) amended by U.N.S.C. Res 1166, in which the ICTY was established.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 9}.
32

See, U.N.S.C. Res 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess. 3453rd mtg., at U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994), in which the ICTR was established. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 14}.
33

34

See, Art. 48(2) of the UN Charter. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.
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to use non-military means to satisfy its Chapter VII mandate. 35 Neither allowed the
application of the principle of complementarity or domestic courts to assert jurisdictional
primacy. Although the ICC differs somewhat from the ICTY and the ICTR, since it was
not created as a direct, subsidiary body of the SC, the experiences of the tribunals and
general world opinions concerning the ad hoc tribunals are relevant concerning the
cooperative role between the ICC and the SC.
Finally, “nothing in the UN Charter prohibits referral to another international
organization as an enforcement measure [to restore international peace and security],” 36
and it logically follows that the SC should be able to refer situations to the ICC in the
same manner as it has to the ICTY and the ICTR. Finally, the establishment of the
international tribunals by the SC represented the “first widening of the obligation to
cooperate [by] States that [were] not party [to the Statutes].” 37 The same relationship that
existed between the SC and the ad hoc tribunals, also exists between the SC and its
power to make Article 13(b) referrals to the ICC. Even if the Sudan is not party to the

See, Art. 41 of the UN Charter. See generally, Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.
35

Kenneth S. Gallant, The ICC in the System of States and International Organizations,
16 Leiden Journal of International Law 553, 582 (2003). { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 51}.
36

See, Guiseppe Nesi, “The Obligation to Cooperate with the International Criminal
Court and States not Party to the Statute,” IN THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY (EDS.)
MAURO POLITI & GUISEPPE NESI (2001), at 222. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 45}.
37
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Rome Statute, the obligation to cooperate with the SC’s Chapter VII mandates is
extended beyond treaty provisions. 38
1.) The Establishment of the ICTY
The history of the Yugoslav conflict caused the SC to determine that, in the
interest of preserving international peace and security, it was necessary to establish an ad
hoc international tribunal to try war criminals. 39 On 25 May 1993, the SC officially
adopted a resolution establishing the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter “the ICTY Statute”) by employing Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. 40

The legitimacy of Chapter VII powers are also reiterated in all

subsequent resolutions amending the ICTY Statute as the justification for the
establishment of the tribunal. Article I of the ICTY Statute established the competence of
the ICTY to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and affirmed the legitimacy and impartiality of the tribunal. 41 The
ICTY Statute suggests the possibility of the principle of complementarity, in that national
courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the ICTY to prosecute persons for serious
violations of international humanitarian law. 42 However, the ICTY Statute also explicitly

See generally, Article 103 of the UN Charter. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 3}.
39
See, U.N.S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 13}.
38

See, U.N.S.C. Res. 827, supra footnote 32. See generally, The ICTY Statute as
amended by subsequent U.N.S.C. resolutions. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 9}.
40

41

Id.

See, Article 9(1) of the ICTY Statute. {Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
9}.
42
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states that the principle of complementarity is limited by the primacy of the Tribunal and
domestic courts must defer to the ICTY at all times. 43
The nature of the establishment of the ICTY should be analyzed because it
represents a historical, “Grotian moment” 44 in which new, universally accepted and
binding international humanitarian law is created. Similarly, the acceptance by the ICC
of the SC’s referral of the situation in the Darfur, and a limitation on the principle of
complementarity, could represent another important Grotian moment. The opinions of
UN Delegates regarding the establishment of the ICTY suggest that it truly was a Grotian
moment for customary international law. These statements are construable toward any
SC employment of Article 41 and therefore relevant in a discussion regarding SC use of
the ICC as a forum to enforce its Chapter VII powers.
The record of the 3,175th meeting of the SC (prior to the adoption of Resolution
808) demonstrates that SC delegates approved the use of Chapter VII to establish the
ICTY. 45 Mr. Merimee (France) indicated that the competence of the ICTY was

43

Id. at Article 9(2).

See, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, The Role of International Law in the 21st Century: A
Grotian Moment, 18 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1609 (1995). This is perhaps the first time that
the term “Grotian moment” (named for Hugo de Groot, the “father of international law”)
was used to refer to “a renaissance of international law needed to help transform the
world. . .” Boutros-Ghali specifically identifies the establishment of the ICTY by the SC
as a Grotian moment (1613). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 48}.
44

See generally, U.N.S.C. Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3,175th Meeting (22
February 1993) at U.N. Doc S/PV.3175. Reproduced in VIRGINIA MORRIS &
MICHAEL P. SCHARF (EDS.), AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS VOL. 2 (1995). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 11}.
45
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established a priori by the SC acting under its powers derived from Chapter VII.46 Mr.
de Araujo Castro (Brazil) affirmed the principle that the authority of the SC “is not selfconstituted but originates from a delegation of powers by the whole membership of the
[UN]” (emphasis added) and that “the SC, in the exercise of its responsibilities, acts on
behalf of all [member states].” 47 Finally, Mr. Yañez-Barneuvo (Spain) also indicated to
any of those who doubted the competence of the SC, that the establishment of an ad hoc
tribunal was perfectly within the scope of the SC’s powers and that the SC was not
“attempting to establish any new jurisdictional or legislative framework of a permanent
nature,” nor was it “setting itself up as a permanent judge or legislature.” 48 Thus, the SC
was acting as a legislative finder of facts as opposed to a judicial body that would
investigate and prosecute. These views were reiterated at subsequent meetings 49 and the
general consensus of SC delegates suggests that the SC was completely justified in
exercising its Chapter VII powers to establish the ICTY.
The only delegate that made any significant protest as to the legitimacy of the SC
establishing the ICTY was, not surprisingly, the mission from Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) (hereinafter “Serbia”). Mr. Djokić, in his letter dated 19 May 1993, stated
that Serbia felt that its national courts could adequately prosecute individuals and the SC
lacked the power under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to establish both a tribunal and the

46

See generally, Id. at 164.

47

Id. at 162.

48

Id. at 172.

See generally, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3,217th Meeting (25 May 1993), at
U.N. Doc/ SPV.3217, IN supra footnote 43, at 179 et seq. { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 12}.
49

12

ICTY Statute. 50 However, this was obviously a biased opinion and the SC, and the UN
as an entire body, made the determination that Serbia was not able to adequately
prosecute persons in its own courts and that the SC was legitimized in establishing the
ICTY. For the first time since the creation of the UN in 1948, the SC utilized its Chapter
VII powers to create an ad hoc Tribunal. The unanimous support for this innovation in
the application of incidental authority 51 truly represents a Grotian Moment in
international law. The power that the SC was legitimately able to apply concerning the
ICTY should apply to a referral to the ICC since its relationship is almost exactly the
same concerning the two international judicial bodies.

2.) The Precedence of The Prosecutor v. Tadic
The ICTY’s decisions in the seminal case of The Prosecutor v. Tadic 52 confirmed
the legitimacy of both the ICTY and the SC’s power to make referrals to an international
court pursuant to its Chapter VII mandate without the hindrance of the principle of

See, Letter Dated 19 May 1993 From the Chargé D’Affairs A.I. of the Permanent
Mission of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the U.N. Addressed to the Secretary
General at U.N. Doc. A/48/170, S/25801 (21 May 1993). IN supra footnote 43, at 480.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 7}.
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Incidental Authority is defined as “authority needed to carry out actual or apparent
authority.” Although it is not explicit, it is deemed to be necessary and directly stemming
from actual authority. The creation of an ad hoc tribunal, while not expressly given
under Art. 41 of the UN Charter, is a prime example of incidental authority afforded to
the SC. See, Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004), authority (West 2005). { Reproduced
in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 57}.
51

See generally, Prosecutor v. Tadic, supra at footnote 30. { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 27}. See also, Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Opinion and Judgment (7 May 1997). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
28}.
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complementarity. The ICC represents an evolution of the ad hoc tribunals 53 and the
jurisdictional precedence set by this case is quite influential. The role of the SC in
relationship to international tribunals was clearly continued by the precedent of Tadic and
subsequent ICTY cases.
In its 1995 Appeal, the Defense in Tadic first attempted to attack the ICTY’s
jurisdiction on the grounds that the SC lacked the power to establish an international
criminal tribunal and therefore that the ICTY was an illegitimate judicial body. The
ICTY determined that the SC did have “general powers to maintain and restore
international peace and security under Chapter VII at large,” and that Chapter VII powers
require all UN member states to “cooperate with the organization and with one another
[to implement] action or measures decided by the SC.” 54 Additionally, the ICTY found
that, while Article 41 did not explicitly confer a power to the SC, it could establish an
international criminal tribunal; “prima facie the International Tribunal matches perfectly
the description in Article 41 of ‘measures not involving the use of force.” 55 The ICTY
also determined that, “if the [UN] can undertake measures which have to be implemented
through the intermediary of its Members, it can a fortiori undertake measures which it
can undertake directly via its organs,” and “action by Member States on behalf of the
See, “Evaluating the ICC Regime: The Likely Impact on States and International Law,”
Address by Mr. Hans Corell at a training course organized by T.M.C. Asser Institute,
Science Alliance and No Peace Without Justice, 21 December 2000, Peace Palace – The
Hague, The Netherlands, at 15. Mr. Corell indicated that “once the [ICC] enter[ed] into
operation . . . the need for creating additional ad hoc tribunals by the Security Council in
cases in which [it] is acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter” would be eliminated.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 60}.

53

See, Tadic, supra footnote 30, at ¶ 31. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 27}.
54

55

Id. at ¶ 34.
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Organization is but a poor substitute faute de mieux, or a ‘second best’ for want of the
first.” 56
Avoiding implementation via UN Member State’s own initiated actions ensures
that the SC can implement its mandates more effectively and with less detrimental
interference from third parties. Finally, the ICTY held that the establishment of the
tribunal did not result in the SC “usurping for itself part of a judicial function which does
not belong to it” and that “the establishment of a judicial organ . . . [was for] the exercise
of [the SC’s] own principle function of maintenance of peace and security . . . in the
[FY].” 57 Thus, the ICTY felt that Tadic’s challenge of jurisdiction based on the SC
lacking power to establish the tribunal was ill founded. Although the power to establish
an ad hoc tribunal was not explicitly stated in the UN Charter, the power to do so
obviously flowed from Chapter VII.58 Furthermore, the SC was not exercising undue
political influence on an independent judicial body.
Tadic’s second ground for appeal, essentially a complementarity argument, was
vested in the language of Article 9 of the ICTY statute stating that, “. . . the Tribunal and
national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for serious
violations of international humanitarian law.” 59 However, Article 9 also explicitly states
that “the International Tribunal shall have primacy over national courts [and that] . . . at
any state of the procedure [the ICTY] may formally request national courts to defer to the

56
57

58

Id. at ¶ 36.
Id. at ¶ 38.
See, Art. 41 of the UN Charter. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}.

Tadic, supra footnote 30, at ¶ 50. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
27}.
59
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competence of the International Tribunal.” 60 Therefore, while the principle of
complementarity could apply in principle to the ICTY, it does not need to apply in
practice. The ICTY Statute does not delineate a trigger mechanism that is necessary for
the tribunal to assert primacy over national courts and the hurdle to overcome a
complementarity issue is intentionally made quite low.
The Tadic Court’s decision included a discussion of state sovereignty derived
from Article 2(7) of the UN Charter and the power of the SC to override this general
principle when acting pursuant to Chapter VII. The ICTY explicitly stated that, while
“Appellant can call in aid Article 2, paragraph 7 . . . one should not forget the
commanding restriction at the end of the same paragraph: ‘but this principle shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” 61 Article 9 of the
ICTY Statute explicitly confirms that a State can never press for complementary
jurisdiction if a when the SC is acting pursuant to its Chapter VII mandate. The
precedent of the Tadic Appeals case should apply to the ICC and state sovereignty, in the
guise of the principle of complementarity, should not trump a SC referral aimed at
restoring international peace and security.
The subsequent Tadic case, Opinion and Judgment of Prosecutor v. Tadic (7 May
1997), reaffirmed the legitimacy of the ICTY’s jurisdiction. The ICTY first reiterated
that the SC, acting pursuant to Chapter VII, could create an International Tribunal to
contribute to the restoration of international peace and security and that all UN members
are required to cooperate fully with the ICTY as a subsidiary organ of the SC. 62 The

60
61

Id.
Id. at ¶ 56.
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ICTY also confirmed the Trial Chamber’s position that a challenge to the legitimate
establishment of the ICTY was a “non-justiciable issue” and that the ICTY itself was “not
competent to review the decision of the SC [to establish an International Tribunal].” 63
The two Tadic decisions established the precedence that Chapter VII of the UN
Charter enables the SC to establish and refer situations to an international tribunal. SC
referrals are binding and compel all UN Members to cooperate with the tribunals. It is
unimportant whether or not the FY agreed to the mandatory jurisdiction of the ICTY or
whether the principle of complementarity would apply because this was superseded by
the FY’s obligation to the UN itself and the SC’s decision to enforce its mandate via the
tribunal.
Tadic’s jurisdictional challenges parallel the current situation in the Darfur.
While the Sudanese government has not ratified the Rome Statute and accepted the
mandatory jurisdiction of the ICC, they are still a member of the UN and therefore are
bound by all decisions made by the SC. Like the Appellant Tadic, Sudanese persons who
have committed crimes against humanity cannot argue that the ICC lacks jurisdiction
over them. This is a non-justiciable issue because the SC has made the determination that
the ICC does, and should, have jurisdiction over these individuals. The ICC does not
have a bevy of cases to rely upon to for precedence, and therefore the rulings in Tadic are
seminal in determining the role of the SC in its continuation of making referrals to
international tribunals including the ICC.
a.) Post Tadic: The ICTY is Influenced by the ICC
See, Tadic (Opinion and Judgment), supra footnote 50 , at ¶ 2. { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 28}.
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Id. at ¶ 15.
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After the establishment of the ICC by the Rome Statute in 1998, ICTY cases
have been adjudicated in the light that they might influence the precedence of the ICC
and vice versa. In March 2000, the ICTY Trial Chamber stated in The Prosecutor v.
Blaskic, that “International Courts, today this Tribunal, tomorrow the [ICC], must
appropriately punish all those, and especially those holding the highest positions, who
transgress these principles.” 64 The Trial Chamber realized the importance of the nascent
ICC and the influence that the two international tribunals have on each other.
In addition to the public statement made by Judge Jorda, the Blaskic Judgment
itself is filled with references to provisions in the Rome Statute and the court used the
language of the Statute to aid in defining crimes and determining how to adjudicate the
case. 65 Not only was the precedent of Tadic upheld in Blaskic, but the text of the case
indicates the level of cooperation that is expected between all international tribunals. By
negative inference, this also reaffirms that the SC should enjoy the same comity in all
international tribunals and the principle of complementarily applying to Article 13(b) of
the Rome Statute SC referrals can only erode this convivial relationship.
3.) The Establishment of the ICTR
The SC established another international tribunal to prosecute individuals who
committed crimes against humanity in Rwanda. The Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter the “ICTR Statute”) was adopted on 8 November

See, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Statement of the Trial
Chamber at the Judgment Hearing (3 March 2000), at www.un.org/icty/pressreal/blasumj000303e.htm. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 31}.
64

See generally, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment (3
March 2000). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 30}.
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1994. 66 The ICTR Statute is very similar to the ICTY Statute and affirms that the SC
was acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and that the principle of
complementarity is limited by the primacy of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 67 The ICTR
Statute is explicit in its requirements that UN member states are obliged to cooperate with
the ICTR in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious
violations of international humanitarian law. 68 Unlike the ICTY, the primacy of the
ICTR has not been challenged in a Tadic-like case or by the principle of complementarity.
This provides additional support for the role that the SC should play in relationship to an
international tribunal.
In one of the ICTR’s first adjudicated cases, The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, 69 the
Tribunal took the opportunity to reaffirm its legitimate jurisdictional power. The ICTR
stated that the SC made the determination that the situation in Rwanda represented a
threat to international peace and security and, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, it confirmed that the establishment of the Tribunal was necessary to end
abuses. 70

There have not been any subsequent challenges to either the ICTY’s or

ICTR’s jurisdiction or the power of the SC to refer situations to the tribunals.
The power of the SC to mandate the creation of ad hoc tribunals is firmly
established. If the ICC were to prevent the SC from employing its Chapter VII mandate
See, U.N.S.C. Res. 955, supra footnote 33. See also, subsequent Annex containing the
ICTR Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 14}.
66
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See, Id. at Art. 8(1 – 2).
See, Id. at Art. 28(1).

The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (2 September
1998). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 29}.
69

70

Id. at ¶ 2.
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via the implementation of a superseding principle of complementarity, the result could
very well be the establishment of an alternative ad hoc tribunal to fulfill obligations to the
maintenance of international peace and security. The ICC must keep this in mind if it
hopes to remain a legitimate international judicial body.

C.) The Rome Conference and Debates Concerning the Role of the Security
Council
Logically, the SC’s established role in the ICTY and the ICTR should
automatically confer a similar relationship between the SC and the ICC. The heated
debates at the Rome Diplomatic Conference (hereinafter the “RDC”) prior to the
adoption of the Rome Statute suggest that the role of the SC was not a priori deemed the
same. In particular, the power of the SC to refer a situation to the ICC and to supersede a
state’s own judicial system (i.e. to thwart the principle of complementarity) was the
subject of significant concern among delegates. However, a careful analysis of RDC
delegate’s statements concerning the language of the Rome Statute and a literal
interpretation of the text itself, suggests that the SC is not hindered in its ability to make
referrals.
1.) The RDC Debate Concerning the Role of the Security Council
During the RDC, the SC’s role in the ICC was contested by several delegations
(most notably India). As stated in the Rome Statute, the SC has the power to refer
situations, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to the ICC Prosecutor when
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an Article 5 71 crime has been committed. 72 The Indian position, articulated by delegate
Mr. Lahiri, envisioned no role for the SC in the ICC. Primarily, India felt that “the [ICC]
was an independent judicial body” and that “the [ICC], unlike the [SC] had no role
whatsoever in the maintenance of international peace and security.” 73 India was also
concerned that “a large number of States Members of the UN considered that the
structure of the SC was unrepresentative.” 74 Essentially, Mr. Lahiri argued that SC
involvement in the ICC would bring an unwanted political element to the functioning of
the Court and that the two bodies should be completely independent – the only way to
achieve this would be complete disassociation by the SC. Other delegates supported
this position, but the majority wanted a role for the SC much like the one that it already
had with the international tribunals.
Many delegates emphasized that the SC had effectively established and
participated in the functioning of the ad hoc tribunals and that “no one had accused the
SC of interfering with [their] independence.” 75 By not allowing the SC to participate in
the ICC, the alternative would be to continue its establishment of future ad hoc
See, Art. 5 of the Rome Statute. Article 5 states that the ICC has jurisdiction over four
core crimes including, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression. Notably, a working definition of “aggression” has yet to be adopted.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 2}.
71

See, Art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
2}.
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10th Meeting of the Diplomatic Conferences (22 June 1998) at A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.10.
Reproduced in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC,
VOL. 3, 179 (2005). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 22}.
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See, Id. at 186. This was the opinion given by Ms. Wilmshurst, the delegate from the
United Kingdom.
75
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International Tribunals – exactly what the ICC was created to supersede. 76 The delegate
from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ms. La Haye, stated that “the SC should have the power to
trigger the jurisdiction of the [ICC] with respect to situations in which one or more of the
core crimes [ICC Statute Article 5] had been committed.” 77 This argument is particularly
persuasive because of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first-hand experience with the ICTY
and its determination that the SC’s relationship with an international tribunal was
effective.
Mr. Lahiri’s official statement regarding the final adoption of the Rome Statute
made the following points: he was dismayed that the SC would have the power to refer
(under Article 13(b)), the power to block (under Article 16), and the power to bind nonStates Parties; The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter the “VCLT”)
explicitly states that no state can be forced to accede to a treaty or be bound by a treaty
that it has not accepted. Mr. Lahiri feared that non-States Parties, working through the
SC (e.g. The United States) could bind other non-States Parties to the jurisdiction of the
ICC. 78
India was the most vocal opponent of Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute and
formally moved to have the final proposal of the Diplomatic Conference amended by
See, Id. Ms. Li Ting’s (China) comment advocated a similar position in which she
stated that, “it was essential that the SC be empowered to refer a cases to the [ICC] since
otherwise it might have to establish a succession of ad hoc tribunals in order to discharge
its mandate under the [UN] Charter.”
76

31st Meeting of the Diplomatic Conference (9 July 1998) at A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.31.,
335. IN supra footnote 71, at 335. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 24}.
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See, “Explanation of Vote by Mr. Dilip Lahiri, Head of Delegation of India, on the
Adoption of the Statute of the ICC,” accessed at: www.un.org/icc/speeches/717ind.htm.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 25}.
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deletion of the article. 79 The amended proposal was defeated by a “strong majority vote
in favour of a no action motion” 80 and Article 13(b) remained in the Rome Statute.
While there was some dissention about the scope of Article 13(b) during the RDC, by the
time the Rome Statute was adopted, the disagreement disappeared. 81 The final draft of
the Rome Statute should be taken to represent a determination that the SC has the power
to make referrals and its mandate is enforceable regardless of whether a third state82 has
ratified the Rome Statute. The fact that there was such strong support for continuing the
SC’s role in the ICC firmly suggests that it should be a non-issue at this point.
In 2000, the UN and the ICC confirmed the majority holding of the RDC in a
draft agreement governing the relationship between the two bodies. 83 The ICC and the
UN “recognized the responsibilities of the UN under the [UN] Charter, in particular in
the fields of international peace and security,” and agreed to “cooperate” – especially
when the SC makes a 13(b) referral pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 84 This

See, Morten Bergsmo, The Jurisdictional Regime of the International Criminal Court
(Part II, Articles 11-19), 6/4 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal
Justice 36 (1998). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 47}.
79
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Id.
See, Hans Corell, supra footnote 51, at 7. Corell indicates that the issue of SC 13(b)
referrals was “not the subject of much controversy during the negotiation process [of the
RDC].” An increasing minority of delegates were pushing for SC non-involvement as
the Conference progressed. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 60}.
81

See, Art. 34 of The VCLT, 1155 UNTS 331. A “third state” is understood by the
Vienna Convention to be a state that “a treaty does not create either obligations or rights
[for it] without its consent.” { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4}.
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See generally, Draft Relationship Agreement Between the UN and the ICC, at U.N.
Doc. PCNICC/2000.WGICC-UN/L.1 (9 August 2000). { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 5}.
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Id. at Articles 2 and 4.
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document codifies the expressed opinions of the RDC delegates and is demonstrative of
the consensus after 1998.
Of particular interest to the current SC referral of the situation in Darfur, is the
Sudanese statement made at the 30th Meeting of the Diplomatic Conference. Mr. Mayang
D’Awol explicitly stated that “the inherent jurisdiction of the [ICC] should cover
genocide and certain other categories of crime” and that “the SC had a special role in
matters relating to the question of aggression.” 85 Thus, the Sudanese themselves were
willing to concede that the core crimes of Article 5 of the Rome Statute should be
adjudicated by the ICC and that the SC, as defined by the UN Charter, had a significant
and special role in determining when these crimes had been perpetrated. Perhaps hinting
at their future decision not to ratify the Rome Statute, the Sudan also made the comment
that “the States whose acceptance was needed as a precondition to the exercise of
jurisdiction should be confined to the State on whose territory the act took place and the
State which had custody of the person suspected of the crime.” 86 The position is not
very well articulated, but seems to stand for the proposition that; if an act, in violation of
Article 5 of the Rome Statute occurred in the sovereign territory of a state not party to the
Statute, then the ICC should not be allowed to exercise jurisdiction unless the state has
accepted it. This is the position that is still held by the Sudanese government today
concerning the SC’s referral of the situation in Darfur to the ICC. The Sudan feels that
this referral should have no binding power over it because it has not ratified the Rome

30th Meeting of the Diplomatic Conference (9 July 1998) at A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.30.,
324, IN supra footnote 71, at 324. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
23}.
85
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Id.
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Statute and has not agreed to its jurisdiction. However, the consensus on the language
and intention of the final draft of the Rome Statute makes this position irrelevant.
2.) Opinions Regarding Article 13(b) and the SC’s Role in the ICC.
The SC’s Article 13(b) referral power has inspired some scholarly debate
following the 1998 RDC. The primary issues discussed are: can SC referrals be subject
to the principle of complimentary; can States not party to the Rome Statute nevertheless
still be bound by the ICC’s jurisdiction for violations of customary international law;
should the principle of universal jurisdiction apply in regards to violations of customary
international law; is the judicial independence of the ICC maintained when the SC, a
political body, has influence, and; would the alternative to SC involvement in the ICC, a
continuation of ad hoc International Tribunals, defeat the primary purpose of the ICC.
a.) Chapter VII and Article 12 of the Rome Statute
Article 12 of the Rome Statute specifically delineates when the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction over a state and supersede the principle of complementarity. 87 Jurisdiction is
preconditioned upon a state’s acceptance of the Rome Statute (Article 12(2)) or by
acceptance of the ICC’s jurisdictional primacy over Non-States Parties (Article 12(3)). 88
Article 12 does not; however, explicitly provide for the ability of states to accept
jurisdiction in situations referred by the SC. 89 By negative inference, since there is no
mention of the principle of complementarity applying to SC 13(b) referrals in Article 12

See generally, Article 12 of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 2}.
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Id.
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See, Gennady M. Danilenko, “ICC Statute and Third States,” In THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE ICC: A COMMENTARY (EDS.) ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL.
(2002), at 1875. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 42}.
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of the Rome Statute, it cannot block the SC when acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. 90
According to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, third states, not party to the
Rome Statute, may choose when to employ the jurisdiction of the ICC. 91 However, many
scholars argue that the principle of complementarity, and the employment of domestic
jurisdiction, should not apply when the SC has referred a Chapter VII situation to the
ICC. 92 A SC referral to the ICC has its competence vested in Chapter VII and,
“irrespective of whether or not states are Parties to the [Rome] Statute,” 93 the Court will
be able to exercise jurisdiction. 94 Without the hindrance of the principle of
complementarity, a UN Member is bound to cooperate with the SC’s mandate regardless
of whether this could stymie domestic judicial sovereignty and a refusal to do so may

See, Michael A. Newton, supra footnote 26, at 49. “The obligations of all states to
accept and carry out the decisions of the [SC] effectively nullifies [the] right of
complementarity.” { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 52}.
90

Id. at 26. The principle of complementarity does not apply to irresponsible states that
refuse to prosecute nationals.
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See generally, Morten Bergsmo, Occasional Remarks on Certain State Concerns about
the Jurisdictional Reach of the ICC, and Their Possible Implications for the Relationship
Between the Court and the SC, 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 87, 100 (2000).
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 46}.
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Roy S. Lee, “Creating an International Criminal Court – Of Procedures and
Compromises,” supra footnote 25, at 149. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 44}.
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See, Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, “Reflections on the Jurisdiction and Trigger Mechanism
of the ICC,” supra footnote 25, at 59. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
38}.
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result in a violation of a member state’s obligations under the UN Charter which
supersedes the validity of any treaty obligations. 95
The mandatory character of a SC referral, even though it “remains subject to the
judicial supervision of the Pre-Trial Chamber and to the review of the Appellate
Chamber,” places it outside of the restraints of Article 12 of the Rome Statute. 96 While
third states in many instances can claim exemption from the mandatory jurisdiction of the
ICC under Article 12, this clearly does not apply when the SC has made a referral. The
United States, which is not party to the Rome Statute, has been particularly wary of the
ICC extending jurisdiction over nationals 97 and superseding its domestic courts. 98

See, Arts. 25 & 49 of the UN Charter which requires UN Member States to provide
assistance and cooperation to all SC determinations stemming from Chapter VII.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 3}. See also, Gennady M. Danilenko,
supra footnote 87, at 1889. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 42}.
95

M. Cherif Bassiouni, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ICC:
INTRODUCTION, INTRODUCTION ANALYSIS, AND INTEGRATED TEXT OF
THE STATUTE, ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE, VOL. 1 (2005), 131. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 39}.
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See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.A. 7421-3 (West 2005) in which the United State’s expresses its
fundamental objections to the jurisdiction of the ICC. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 33}. See also, U.N.G.A. Press Release, “Consensus Agreement on Two
Texts Said to Augur Well for Functioning of International Criminal Court,” at U.N. Doc.
GA/L/3149 (2000). The U.S. did imply that it wanted to be a “good neighbor to the
[ICC]” and that it would be willing to accept the primacy of 13(b) referrals over the
principle of complementarity. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 10}.
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But see, 27 March 2003 transcript of a speech given by Ambassador David Scheffer at
Vanderbilt University School of Law, at David Scheffer, Advancing U.S. Interests With
the ICC, 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 1567, 1573 (2003). Ambassador Scheffer made the
comment, that while the United States does have substantial domestic legislation that
could be used to prosecute and investigate individuals (See, e.g., the Alien Torts Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 1350 (West 2005). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
34}.), pending amendment by S. Res. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005)), this legislation is
“limited” and presents a “weakness in the American system” which could leas the ICC to
“seize the case.” Scheffer advocates a change in the legislation so that it is “directly in
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However, the United States demonstrated that it will support SC referrals to the ICC and
will not attempt to block them. 99
The principles of complementarity and state sovereignty do not supersede a UN
Member State’s obligations to the UN Charter. While the Sudan is not a party to the
Rome Statute and could argue that they have not accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction in
accordance with Article 12(3), 100 it is still a member of the UN and obligated to
cooperate with any determination made by the SC pursuant to Chapter VII. This holds
true in any third state where the SC has made the determination that a referral to the ICC
is necessary to uphold its mandate and the past experiences with the ICTY and ICTR
demonstrate that States are generally very willing to aid an international criminal tribunal
when their domestic courts or laws are incapable of adequate prosecution. 101
c.) The Principle of Universal Jurisdiction and
Complementarity
line with the standards set by the ICC.” { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
55}.
See, U.N.SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., at U.N. Doc S/pV.5158 (2005). Mrs. Patterson
(United States) commented that, the United States “decided not to oppose the SC
resolution [1593] because of the need for the international community to end the climate
of impunity in the Sudan” and that SC referrals could supersede third State’s application
of the principle of complementarity. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
19}.
100
See, Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 2}.
99

See, e.g., The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR
96-17-T, Amended Indictment (7 July 1998). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 32}. See also, “Surrender of Rwandan to War Crimes Tribunal Sets Precedent,”
Human Rights First Media Alert at www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2001_1996/ntakirut100.htm.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 63}. Defendant was living in Texas
and taken into custody by U.S. officials after the ICTR determined that he had
perpetrated crimes against humanity in Rwanda. His subsequent transfer to the custody
of the ICTR is demonstrative of the U.S. supporting the primacy of the tribunal and in
effect the SC’s Chapter VII mandate instead of attempting to conduct investigations and
prosecutions domestically.
101
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During the RDC, Germany, along with a group of other states, argued that
universal jurisdiction over the core crimes articulated in Article 5 of the Rome Statute
was well established. 102 The German proposal was rejected during The RDC because
other delegates regarded universal jurisdiction as too broad and impinging upon state
sovereignty and the principle of complementarity set forth in Article 12 of the Rome
Statute. 103 However, if the ICC lacks universal jurisdiction over Article 5 core crimes,
any individual State still retains the right to try individuals in breach of customary
international law. Individuals “run a much greater risk of being tried for the same crimes
by domestic courts [situated] in individual [States] of the international community,” 104
and multiple judicial systems could result in inconsistent decisions whereas the ICC
promotes uniformity and there is no guarantee that a domestic court could try individuals
as effectively as the ICC. 105 The application of the principle of universal jurisdiction in
the ICTY and the ICTR suggests that any referral made by the SC should be “unbounded
by geography” and can be applied by the SC to “all the human beings in the world” arguably this concept is also applicable to the ICC. 106

See e.g., Danilenko, supra footnote 87, at 1876. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 42}.
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See, Hans Corell, supra footnote 51, at 15. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 60}.
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Leila Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 Geo. L.J. 381, 410 (2000). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 54}.
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The application of customary international law, such as the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter the “Genocide
Convention”) is unaffected by the principle of complementarity. The Genocide
Convention established “genocide [as] a crime under international law, contrary to the
spirit and aims of the UN and condemned by the civilized world.” 107 Violations of the
Genocide Convention are justiciable in any valid and legitimate forum. This suggests
that, the ICC could retain universal jurisdiction over Article 5 core crimes, regardless of
whether a state has accepted its jurisdiction or ratified the Rome Statute, since these are
crimes prosecutable in any legitimate and unbiased court. 108 .
d.) The Judicial Independence of the ICC
Another issue raised at the RDC was whether, the SC, as a political body, could
unduly influence the independent judicial nature of the ICC. However, the “objections
raised at the Conference” could also be viewed as “purely political” and do not really add
any credence to the politicization argument. 109 The SC has had ample opportunity to
exert political influence over the ad hoc tribunals and this has yet to occur. 110 The SC

The Genocide Convention Preamble, 72 UNTS 277. See also, The Genocide
Convention Art. 1. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 1}.
108
See, Danilenko, supra footnote 87, at 1878. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 42}.
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See, Berman, supra footnote 25, at 175. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 40}.
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See, supra footnote 71, at 183. Commentary made by Ms. Wilmshurst (United
Kingdom) at 10th meeting of the RDC. She stated: “no one had accused the SC of
interfering with the independence of the [ICTY or ICTR], which had already been in
operation for some time” and “was somewhat puzzled by the fears expressed by some of
the delegations that [SC referrals to the ICC] would interfere with the independence of
the Court simply because the SC was a political body.” { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 22}.
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merely mandated the establishment of the ICTY and ICTR and has not attempted
influence judicial proceedings.
While the SC has the political initiative and power to determine if it, acting
pursuant to Chapter VII, wants to make a referral to the ICC, its “political” influence
does not extend any further. The SC is not involved in any of the judicial proceedings of
the ICC and all investigatory work is done by the Prosecutor and the Court itself. 111 The
Prosecutor, States Parties to the Rome Statute and the SC may all make referrals to the
ICC. The SC alone is not the only body entrusted with this power and therefore it seems
fallacious to infer that it has undue political influence when it is clearly the case that
many other parties may refer situations to the ICC. 112 Furthermore, Article 13(b) 113
gives the SC the power only to refer a situation and not a case to the ICC. This language
was chosen precisely to preserve the judicial independence of the ICC. A ‘case’ itself
only arises after investigatory proceedings have been commenced by the ICC. 114
The ICC Prosecutor has considerable power and can check any perceived
politicization. He may initiate any investigations by the Court propio motu on the basis
of a violation of an Article 5 crime 115 and he is given the power to investigate and
conclude if there is any reasonable basis to commence proceedings in the ICC if the

See generally, M.M. El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to
Implement International Criminal Law, 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. 869, 957-8 (2002).
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 49}.
112
See, Antonio Cassese et al, “The Rome Statute: A Tentative Assessment,”, IN supra
footnote 87, at 1907. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 41}.
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See, Art. 13(b) of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
2}.
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See, supra footnote 108, at 959. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 22}.

115

Art. 15(1) of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 2}.
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situation is referred by any other source. 116 The fact that the SC is not the only body
capable of referring situations to the ICC, the role of the Prosecutor in determining what
cases will actually be heard in the ICC, and the absence of the SC politicizing the
proceedings of the ICTY and ICTR should alleviate any lingering concerns about the
undue political influence of the SC in the ICC’s affairs.
e.) The Alternative to the SC Possessing the Power to Refer
Situations to the ICC – A Continuation of the Ad Hoc
Tribunals
If the SC were not allowed to effectively employ the ICC as its forum to aid in the
restoration of international peace and security, does retain the power to establish new ad
hoc tribunals. This power is vested in the SC by virtue of Chapter VII and the
precedence of the ICTY and the ICTR even after the adoption of the Rome Statute.117 By
allowing the principle of complementarity to apply to Chapter VII referrals, the ICC
would essentially act in contravention to the will of the UN because there is a strong
possibility, in deferring to a domestic judiciary body, that cases would go unprosecuted
and the threat to international peace and security would be unresolved. Allowing the
principle of complementarity to thwart SC 13(b) referrals would result in greater

Art. 15(3) of the Rome Statute. See generally, Arts. 15 and 53 of the Statute.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 2}.
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See, Morten Bergsmo, supra footnote 90, at 110. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 46}. See generally, Tadic (Decision on the Defense Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) supra footnote 50 { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 27}, supporting the general principle that the SC is inherently allowed
to establish ad hoc Tribunals pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See also, supra
footnote 71, at 186. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 22}. Comments
made by Ms. Li Ting (China) at the 10th Meeting of the Diplomatic Conference. She
stated that it was “essential that the SC be empowered to refer cases to the ICC since
otherwise it might have to establish a succession of ad hoc tribunals in order to discharge
its mandate under the UN Charter.”
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economic costs to the international community and cause the ICC’s image to suffer as it
could be viewed as incapable of adjudicating many important cases.
To have an ICC unavailable to the SC would be “absurd” and “compelling the SC
to continue . . . to pursue the ad hoc route would [be] impractical and wasteful.” 118 It is
inefficient to have both new ad hoc tribunals and the ICC existing at the same time. The
ad hoc tribunals are economically burdensome and have adjudicated a relatively small
amount of cases. Whereas the ICC is more expedient and is supposed to be readily
available to handle situations referred to it. 119 Delegates to the RDC constantly reiterated
that “the [ICC] would obviate the need for the creation of ad hoc tribunals,” 120 and that
the SC’s experience and competence with the ad hoc tribunals would enhance the
effectiveness of the ICC. 121 Having all future Chapter VII situations referred by the SC
to the ICC would provide an easier and more effective means to promote uniform
interpretations of international law without the burden of multiple concurrent
international criminal courts. 122

See, Berman, supra footnote 25, at 175. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 40}.
119
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Notebook at Tab 60}.
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See, e.g., supra footnote 71, at 179-80. Commentary from Mr. Nyasulu (Malawi), Mr.
Kessel (Canada) and Ms. Blokar (Slovenia) at the 10th Meeting of the RDC.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 22}.
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See, Flavia Lattanzi, “The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions,” In
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D.) The Application of the Principle of Complementarity in the Darfur
The majority of this memorandum focused on the general relationship between
the SC and the ICC. This should read as both an analysis of how the ICC should treat a
SC referral, and as a determination that the principle of complementarity should never
apply when a situation is referred to the ICC when the SC is acting pursuant to its
Chapter VII mandate. The referral of the Darfur situation is the first time that the SC has
exercised its Article 13(b) power. Assuming, in arguendo, that the principle of
complementarity hypothetically applied and the primacy of a SC referral was not at issue,
this portion of the memorandum will analyze the nature of Article 17 and its relationship
to the situation in the Darfur. 123
1.) Article 17 of the Rome Statute
Article 17 of the Rome Statute limits the ICC’s jurisdiction to cases where a
state’s domestic courts are unwilling 124 or unable 125 to genuinely carry out the
investigation of Article 5 crimes or to prosecute individuals for the commissioning of
these crimes. 126

While Article 17 primarily applies to States party to the Rome Statute,

See generally, Art. 17 of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 2}. This memorandum will discuss why the Sudan is unwilling or unable to
genuinely prosecute individuals who have breached Art. 5 and assert why this is a
persuasive corollary against allowing the principle of complementarity to apply in the
Darfur situation in addition to the already proposed conclusion of SC Chapter VII referral
supremacy.
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Id. Art. 17(2) defines “unwillingness” as: pretextual domestic proceedings designed to
“shield the individual from being prosecuted elsewhere; or an unjustified delay in the
proceedings; or proceedings not conducted with impartiality and that are inconsistent
with a necessary manner needed to bring an individual to justice. { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 2}.
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Id. Art. 17(3) defines “inability” as “a substantial or total collapse of a domestic
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or those who have accepted its jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12; arguably, the principle
of complementarity should not apply to any state that cannot genuinely investigate or
prosecute individuals. A SC 13(b) referral is indicative of a situation where peace and
security have deteriorated to the point where Article 17 cannot apply. Similarly, a failure
to satisfy Article 17 can be used as evidence to support an uncontestable SC Chapter VII
referral.
Third State’s claims that their domestic courts are willing and able to genuinely
investigate and prosecute individuals should be reviewed to determine if they are merely
pretextual to shield government officials. If a State claims that it is going to investigate
and prosecute but has no intention of doing so, the principle of complementarily serves to
prevent the situation from coming to justice. Although, non-States Parties are generally
unbound by the Rome Statute if they have not ratified it 127 , the interests of international
justice and public policy demand that an Article 17 style test still be applied. 128
If a State cannot meet Art. 17’s criteria for complementarity, the case should be
“de facto admissible [to the ICC or a genuinely willing and able foreign jurisdiction].” 129
The effective result of preserving the judicial sovereignty of a third state unable to
investigate or prosecute would be a disservice to justice. There is nothing to stop the SC
See generally, Art. 17 of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 2}.
127
See generally, Article 34 of the VCLT, supra footnote 80. { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4}.
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See e.g., Louise Arbour and Martin Bergsmo, “Conspicuous Absence of Jurisdictional
Overreach,” IN supra footnote 25, at 137. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
Tab 37}.
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See e.g., M.M. El Zeidy, The Ugandan Government Triggers the First Test of the
Complementarity Principle: An Assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the ICC,
5 International Criminal Law Review 83, 104 (2005). { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 50}.
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from creating an ad hoc tribunal to adjudicate or another competent foreign jurisdiction
seizing the matter. If the SC were blocked by a State’s pretextual demand to employ the
principle of complementarity, the efficacy of the ICC as an international judicial
enforcement body would be irreparably hindered. 130

2.) The Sudan and Article 17 of the Rome Statute
In addition to the situation in the Darfur necessitating a SC referral pursuant to its
Chapter VII mandate, 131 the Sudan is a third state incapable of satisfying Article 17 of the
Rome Statute. 132 This is yet another reason why it should not be allowed to prevent the
ICC from exercising jurisdiction by employing the principle of complementarity. The
recent history of the situation in the Darfur and the UN’s intervention demonstrate that
the Sudan is not genuinely willing or able to investigate or prosecute individuals in its
domestic courts and allowing it to do so would be a thwarting of justice.
a.) UN Actions Prior to the ICC Referral

See e.g., Arsanjani, IN supra footnote 25, at 70. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 38}.
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See, U.N.S.C. Res. 1593, supra footnote 6. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook
at Tab 20}.
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See, e.g., Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, Back to the Future: The Imperative of Prioritizing
for the Protection of Human Rights in Africa, 47 Journal of African Law 1, 2. Odinkalu
states that “the fulfillment of the responsibilities implied by the primacy of domestic
jurisdiction in international law requires functional states to be able to provide basic
protections to their inhabitants.” He implies that this is a situation that is not unique to
the Sudan alone and that generally, “the post-colonial African State has manifestly been
unable to play [this role].” { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 53}.
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Prior to the SC’s referral to the ICC, the UN gave the Sudan ample opportunity to
end impunity and flagrant violations of customary international law. This was the time
for the Sudan to demonstrate that Article 17 should still apply to them and that they were
genuinely able and willing to prosecute and investigate individuals. When the SC
employed its Chapter VII mandate, and made its Article 13(b) referral to the ICC, the
Sudan lost all opportunities to argue for the application of the principle of
complementarity.
On 3 July 2004, the UN issued a Joint Communique Between the Government of
Sudan and the UN 133 (hereinafter the “Joint Communique”) urging the Sudanese
government to end impunity, immediately investigate and cease all human rights
violations, and ensure that individuals and groups accused of violations were brought to
justice without delay. 134 The UN allowed the Sudan to practice a “complementarity of
self-policing” (i.e. the Sudan’s sovereign right to handle situations prior to necessary SC
intervention). The Sudan did not adequately respond to the Joint Communique and
“widespread human rights violations, including unrelenting attacks on civilians,” 135
continued at an alarming rate.
In response, the SC established the ICID to investigate violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law in the Darfur by all parties; both the Sudanese

Joint Communique Between the Government of Sudan and the UN on the Occasion of
the Visit of the Secretary General 29 June -3 July 2004. Accessed at
www.unmis.org/english/documents/JC.pdf. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
6}.
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U.N.S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5015th mtg., at U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556
(2004). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 16}.
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government and rebel forces. 136 Additionally, if the Sudan failed to comply with the
provisions of the Joint Communique, the SC threatened a consideration of additional
measures pursuant to Article 41 of the UN Charter. 137
b.) The Findings of the ICID
The Report of the ICID (hereinafter the “Report”) demonstrated that not only
were flagrant abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law continuing in
the Darfur, but that the Sudanese judicial and penal system was completely unwilling and
unable to properly handle the crisis. The findings of the ICID in the Report prompted the
SC first to establish the UN Mission in Sudan (hereinafter the “UNMIS”) placing 10,000
military personnel and civilian police officers in the Sudan 138 and subsequently to refer
the situation to the ICC. 139 The Report unequivocally demonstrated that Article 17 of the
Rome Statute was not satisfied and the referral unequivocally demonstrated that the
Sudan should not have any opportunity to employ the principle of complementarity at all.
The ICID felt a SC Chapter VII referral was necessary because: the ICC was
established to deal with crimes that pose threats to international peace and security; the
investigation and prosecution of persons, enjoying prestige and authority in [the Sudan]
and wielding control over the State [judicial] apparatus demonstrate that the Sudan is
unwilling; only the SC has the power to compel both the government and rebels to submit

U.N.S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5040th mtg., at U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564
(2004). { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 17}.
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Tab 20}

139

38

to an investigation; the ICC is the only body that can fairly conduct a neutral and
impartial trial; the ICC can be activated immediately and the establishment of an ad hoc
tribunal would be unduly slow, and; the institution of criminal proceedings before the
ICC would not be necessarily financially burdensome for the international community. 140
(1) The Sudan is Unwilling to Genuinely Investigate and
Prosecute Individuals Domestically
The Report demonstrated that the Sudan was unwilling to genuinely investigate
and prosecute individuals and therefore the principle of complementarity should not
apply. 141 The Sudan, as a signatory of the Rome Statute is bound to “refrain from acts
which would defeat the purpose” of the Statute and therefore cannot claim that does not
apply at all because it has not been ratified. 142 The government of the Sudan was put on
notice concerning allegations of serious crimes being perpetrated in the Darfur and
claimed that it was “acting responsibly and in good faith . . . to put an end to the
violations and bring the perpetrators to justice.” 143 However, not only was the
government continuing to aid militias, but the “distinctions between the police and the
[militias and other armed forces were] often blurred.” 144 This is indicative of a lack of
separation between the government and those committing the atrocities. Additionally,

See, ICID Report, supra footnote 12, at ¶ 572. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 8}.
141
See generally, Art. 17(2) of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 2}.
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See, ICID Report, supra footnote 12, at ¶ 145. { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 8} See also, supra footnote 85, Art. 18 VCLT [ratified by the Sudan on
18 April 1990]. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 4}.
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only one case “relevant to the mandate of the [ICID]” was adjudicated in the Sudan by
the end of 2003. 145
The government aiding of militias, no legitimate police force, and no existence of
an independent or effective judiciary in the Sudan, 146 all infer a complete unwillingness
to genuinely investigate or prosecute individuals. Pretextual judicial bodies, lacking
independence from those in power and whose aim is to shield officials from prosecution,
do not meet the requirements of Article 17 necessary to for complementarily.

(2) The Sudan is Unable to Genuinely Investigate and
Prosecute Individuals Domestically
Article 17(3) 147 of the Rome Statute requires that a state’s judicial system has not
substantially or completely collapsed in order for the principle of complementarity to
apply and allow domestic jurisdiction over the situation. The ICID Report found that
there were serious flaws in the Sudanese judicial system and that it could not act swiftly
and appropriately to address violations of international humanitarian and human rights
law. 148 A state of emergency has existed in the Sudan since 1999 and important
constitutional guarantees are suspended. 149 The criminal code of the Sudan does not
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Id. at ¶ 428.

Id. at ¶¶ 431-2. The ICID found that citizens lacked confidence in an independent
judiciary and that Judges disagreeing with the mandates of the government in Khartoum
“often suffered harassment including dismissals.”
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See, Art. 17(3) of the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab
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ICID Report, supra footnote 12, at ¶ 450. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at
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adequately proscribe war crimes and crimes against humanity as prosecutable offenses
and the executive is granted substantial immunity. 150 Many crimes have also gone
completely uninvestigated and unprosecuted 151 and neither the government nor the rebels
in the Darfur have made any significant steps to rectify this.
The lack of constitutional guarantees in the Sudanese judicial system, law that
does not provide for punishment of breaches of international humanitarian and human
rights law, an inefficient and unproductive judiciary, and a lack of impetus to rectify any
of these situations, affirmatively demonstrates that the Sudan is unable to genuinely
investigate or prosecute individuals pursuant to Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute. Again,
if the principle of complementarity were to apply, it is unlikely that many (if any)
individuals would go unpunished for the crimes that they perpetrated – this holds
especially true for high level officials who effectively control the domestic courts and are
most responsible for the ordering of the commissioning of the most atrocious crimes.
c.) The Situation in the Darfur Subsequent to the Security
Council’s Referral to the ICC
The official notes from the 5158th meeting of the SC attest to the importance of its
first referral to the ICC. 152 The SC determined that the presence of troops and civilian
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See, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess, 5158th mtg. at U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (2005). Sir Parry
(United Kingdom) stated that the outcome of the ICC accepting the SC’s referral would
“serve as a basis for Council Decisions in the future,” and Mr. Mayoral (Argentina) said
that the SC’s referral was “undoubtedly a crucial precedent.” Even those abstaining from
the vote held that it the situation in the Darfur was necessary to “end the climate of
impunity in the Sudan” even if they did not agree with the ICC asserting jurisdiction over
the nationals of non States Parties (Mrs. Patterson (United States)). { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 19}.
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police officers was (and still is) necessary in the Sudan 153 and that the government has
inadequately preserved international peace and security. The referral demonstrates that
the SC felt, pursuant to its Chapter VII mandate, that the only way to end impunity in the
Sudan would be expedient investigation and prosecution by the ICC. On 21 April 2005
the ICC accepted the SC’s referral of the situation in the Darfur and immediately
commenced investigation in Pre-Trial Chamber I. 154 The Prosecutor, Mr. Luis Moreno
Ocampo, also informed the SC that, in light of the principle of complementarity, there
were cases that would be admissible [to the ICC] in relation to the Darfur situation. 155
However, a viewing of a SC referral “in light of the principle of complementarity,”
should never occur. If the SC’s referral is still subject to the principle of
complementarity (on a case by case basis), 156 it is inevitable that some criminals will
avoid adequate prosecution.
The ICID determined that the Sudanese judicial system was fraught with
corruption, non-independent judicial bodies, and supported by laws which do not meet
international standards. Even if some investigations and prosecutions were left to the
Sudan, they could hardly be called adequate. A look at the Sudan’s Embassy to the
United States webpage indicates that the Sudanese government is still not taking
See, e.g., U.N.S.C. Res. 1627, 60th Sess., 5269th mtg. at U.N. Doc. S/RES/1627 (2005).
The SC extended the mandate of Res. 1590 and determined that it was necessary to have
the presence of peacekeeping troops in the Sudan extended. { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 21}.
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See, Letter dated 21 April 2005 from Mr. Philippe Kirsch to Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 61}.
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See, Statement of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno Ocampo, to the SC on
29 June 2005 Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005). { Reproduced in Accompanying
Notebook at Tab 26}.
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responsibility for the situation in the Darfur. 157 This is not demonstrative of a
government that is genuinely willing and able to hold criminals accountable.
Unfortunately, as only time will tell, if dual proceedings (in the domestic courts of the
Sudan and the ICC) are permitted because the principle of complementarity is applied,
they could prove to be inadequate or to produce non-uniform outcomes, the SC could
very well establish a third, ad hoc tribunal to ensure that its mandates under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter were met. Surely, this is a result that the ICC should avoid at all costs.

III.) Conclusions
A.) The Principle of Complementarity Should Never Apply to Security
Council Referrals Pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter
The SC enjoys a responsibility unique among all international organizations, that
of preserving international peace and security world-wide. As demonstrated by the
establishment and full UN acceptance of the ICTY and the ICTR, the SC can and should
be able to employ international criminal courts to fulfill its Chapter VII mandate. Not
only are judicial bodies a preferable means to military action in situation resolution, but
they can influence the establishment of uniform human rights and humanitarian
protections.

The SC’s employment of Chapter VII to establish the ad hoc tribunals

does not differ from the use of Chapter VII to make 13(b) referrals to the ICC that are not
subject to the principle of complementarity.

News articles with titles such as, “No Evidence Sudan’s Government Involved in
Darfur Raid: HRC Official,” and, “The Guardian: Darfur Wasn’t Genocide and Sudan is
not a Terrorist State,” were prominently posted on the Embassy’s webpage when
accessed on 9 November 2005. Accessed at www.sudanembassy.org. { Reproduced in
Accompanying Notebook at Tab 59}.
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It is essential that the ICC is representative of an evolution from the ICTY and
the ICTR and that it is the judicial body most capable of restoring international peace and
security. In allowing the principle of complementarity to apply in Chapter VII situations,
most, if not all crimes could be improperly investigated and prosecuted. The ICC would
be giving a green light to those individuals who want to perpetrate heinous crimes with
the small possibility that they will actually be tried for their actions.
Finally, if the SC is continually thwarted by the principle of complementarity
after it has made a referral to the ICC; there is nothing to stop it from establishing new ad
hoc tribunals. If this were to occur, the legitimacy of the ICC would never recover and
the Court itself might completely loose any relevance. The ICC must demonstrate that it
is the prime forum for adjudication of breaches of customary international law – this is
the best method to ensure that States, such as the United States, 158 will sign and ratify the
Rome Statute because the ICC is perceived as the most legitimate and effective judicial
forum to investigate and prosecute individuals.
B.) Applying the Principle of Complementarity to the Situation in the Darfur
Could Prove to Have Irreparable Ramifications
The situation in the Darfur is getting worse by the day and the perpetuation of
impunity must be ended. The ICID’s findings demonstrate that the Sudan is completely
incapable of genuinely prosecuting or investigating any individuals. To allow the
principle of complementarity would, from a public policy standpoint, be akin to
supporting the commissioning of atrocities. Essentially, a non-action (the ICC allowing
See, 148 Cong. Rec. S3946-01 (2002), in which the U.S. “unsigned” the Rome Statute.
{ Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 35}. See also, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
4568th mtg., at U.N. Doc. S/PV.4568 (2002), in which UN delegates expressed their
confusion and concern regarding the U.S.’s unorthodox method to absolve its obligations
to the Rome Statute. { Reproduced in Accompanying Notebook at Tab 15}.
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the Sudan to investigate and prosecute some individuals) has the same result as an
implied support of crimes perpetrated in the Darfur. If the principle of complementarily
is applied, and the Sudan is allowed to employ its domestic jurisdiction, the ICC is
sending a message to the world-community that, “some times Article 5 crimes will be
investigated and prosecuted by us, while other times they will not.” Not only will this
diminish the legitimacy of the ICC as a judicial body, but it will allow impunity to go
unpunished.
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